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In the context of personnel selection, faking can be de-
fined as a “tendency for test takers to deliberately provide 
inaccurate responses to personality items in a manner that 
they believe will increase their chances of obtaining val-
ued outcomes, such as favorable hiring decision” (Goffin 
& Boyd, 2009, p. 151). Research has shown that candidates 
differ in this tendency, as well as selection programs in the 
level they make faking possible and probable (Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). 
Hence, faking can lower the predictive validity of personal-
ity questionnaires and reduce the quality of selection deci-
sions (Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006). Given 
the fact that faking is a behavior that cannot easily be de-
tected, it is important to better understand the underlying 
psychological process (Goffin & Boyd, 2009), i.e., find the 
factors that determine the occurrence and the intensity of 
faking behavior. In the last decade several authors have sys-
temized potential factors and suggested models that spec-
ify key determinants of faking behavior and relationships 
among them (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 
2000, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton III, 
2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Even though these 
models vary regarding both the specified determinants and 
nature of their relationships, there are several elements they 
all have in common. One of them is the importance of ap-
plicants’ personality in predicting their motivation to fake 
and consequently faking behavior. Some people are more 
prone to faking across many situations, while some will not 
be willing to fake even in situations that make faking easy. 
Hence, faking behavior in personnel selection should be, to 
a certain degree, determined by the candidate’s stable indi-
vidual characteristics—personality traits. 
The connection between dispositional factors and fak-
ing motivation and behavior has been recognized from the 
beginning of research on faking determinants—in the model 
proposed by Snell et al. (1999). The model has not been 
empirically tested, but the authors suggested that disposi-
tional determinants should be searched for in stable indi-
vidual traits that have been theoretically and/or empirically 
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Are there personality traits that predispose applicants to fake  
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Previous research has shown that applicants’ faking on personality questionnaires could lower their predic-
tive validity and reduce the quality of selection decisions. Hence, several models that specify key determinants 
of applicants’ faking responses on noncognitive measures have emerged. One of the common elements of these 
models is the important role of applicants’ personality in predicting their motivation to fake and consequently fak-
ing behavior. Nevertheless, this assumption lacks systematical empirical validation. The goal of the present study 
was to investigate the role of applicants’ personality facets in predicting the amount of faking on a noncognitive 
questionnaire. The total of 202 participants responded to a personality inventory twice—first under instructions to 
respond honestly and afterwards under instructions to respond as an applicant in a simulated selection program. The 
difference between personality scores in two conditions represented the individual amount of faking, which was 
then regressed on the facet scores. As expected, the results confirmed significant contribution of Conscientiousness 
and Neuroticism facets in explaining the variance of faking. However, the most efficient predictors seem to be the 
facets of Openness. The obtained results provide support for personality traits having the important role in predicting 
applicants’ faking behavior on noncognitive measures in personnel selection.
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linked to deceptive behaviors. In partial validation of this 
model, Lueke, Snell, Illingworth, and Paidas (2001) found 
that people vary regarding their general willingness to fake. 
This finding confirms the hypothesis that there are individu-
al differences that determine faking behavior. However, this 
research has not examined specific personality traits that 
could be potential predictors of the motivation to fake.
Roughly at the same time, hypothesis that faking behav-
ior could be predicted by some specific personality traits 
was empirically confirmed by McFarland and Ryan (2000). 
In their study, Neuroticism explained 5.8–16.0% (depend-
ing on the faking operationalization), conscientiousness 
3.6–10.2%, and integrity 3.6–7.3% of the faking behavior 
variance. As hypothesized, high neuroticism results were 
positively correlated with intensity of response distortion 
while correlations with conscientiousness and integrity 
were negative. Authors proposed a model (2000), in which 
relationship between personality and intention to fake was 
mediated by beliefs toward faking. Several years later, Mc-
Farland and Ryan (2006) integrated the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991) into their model, and specified be-
liefs toward faking as attitudes toward faking, subjective 
norms (individual’s perceived social pressure to perform 
or not to perform a behavior), and perceived behavioral 
control (individual’s belief regarding the ease or difficulty 
with which a particular behavior can be performed). Mc-
Farland and Ryan confirmed the main assumptions of their 
revised model in a few empirical validations. Nevertheless, 
this research has not included a closer examination of rela-
tionship between faking behavior and dispositional factors. 
Actually, very few studies have done that. In two studies on 
faking integrity tests, Yu (2008) found that personality trait 
of conscientiousness was moderately negatively correlated 
(r ≈ -.30) with both attitudes toward faking and intention to 
fake. The important role of personality was also confirmed 
in heuristic model of psychological processes underlying 
faking, proposed by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006). Using 
structural equation modeling, they have identified that the 
best predictor of intention to fake was perception of the situ-
ation, followed by personality traits of Machiavellianism, 
neuroticism, and conscientiousness. 
According to the latest model, the general model of fak-
ing behavior, proposed by Goffin and Boyd (2009), the only 
proximal determinant of the faking behavior is the motiva-
tion to fake. Its important predictor is perceived ability to 
fake, which conceptually resembles perceived behavioral 
control—“an individual is less likely to be motivated to fake 
if he or she does not have a self-perception of being able to 
fake” (p. 154). Determinants of motivation and perceived 
ability to fake can be categorized into two major groups 
of factors: individual differences and situationally specific 
contextual antecedents. Relevant individual differences for 
predicting both motivation and perceived ability to fake 
include applicants’ personality traits. Hence, personality 
influences motivation to fake both directly, and via enhanc-
ing perceived ability to fake. As Goffin and Boyd further 
suggest, conscientiousness, neuroticism, Machiavellianism, 
integrity, and need for approval are personality traits with 
the potential to affect an individual’s motivation to fake and 
consequently faking behavior. In addition, the personality 
traits of narcissism, social astuteness, innovation, self-es-
teem, and two narrow facets of Conscientiousness—Com-
petence and Achievement striving—potentially affect fak-
ing behavior through applicant’s perceived ability to fake. 
Despite giving a comprehensive framework for understand-
ing faking on noncognitive measures, Goffin and Boyd have 
not put their model under empirical validation. 
Since it is still not clear which personality traits, and to 
what extent, determine the faking behavior, the goal of the 
present study was to investigate the role of applicants’ per-
sonality in predicting the amount of faking on noncognitive 
measures in personnel selection. For this purpose, we used 
the most comprehensive taxonomy of personality—the five-
factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1987). It is a hierarchical or-
ganization of personality traits in terms of five basic dimen-
sions: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experiences, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness; each consisting of 
six lower-ordered facets (Costa & McCrae, 1995). These 
five relatively independent constructs altogether provide a 
meaningful classification for the study of individual differ-
ences in predicting faking behavior. More specifically, we 
investigated which of the personality dimensions and facets 
contribute to prediction of the faked responses on a person-
ality inventory in simulated selection program. On the basis 
of the results of previous research (Mueller-Hanson et al., 
2006; Yu, 2008), we made the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Conscientiousness facets will be negative-
ly and Neuroticism facets will be positively correlated with 
faked responses on personality questionnaire. Extraversion, 
Openness, and Agreeableness facets will not be related to 
measures of faking.
Even though traits of Conscientiousness and Neuroticism 
had already been proven to be valid predictors of motivation 
to fake, Goffin and Boyd believe that it makes more sense to 
consider narrow facets of both traits. This is because some 
of the facets on the same dimension can be related to faking 
behavior in opposite direction, which can neutralize their 
effect on faking when taken together. For example, Neuroti-
cism facets of Anxiety, Depression, and Vulnerability are 
proposed to have negative relationship with motivation to 
fake, contrary to Impulsiveness, which should be positively 
related to faking behavior. Considering the narrow facets of 
Conscientiousness, Goffin and Boyd propose that the indi-
viduals scoring high in Dutifulness and Deliberation would 
be less motivated to fake. On the other hand, applicants high 
in Achievement striving and Competence would be more 
motivated to fake. The latter relationships should be medi-
ated by perceived ability to fake“—Competence should be 
mediated fully and Achievement striving only partially, in 
addition to direct influence on motivation to fake. Accord-
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ing to the assumptions of Goffin and Boyd (2009), we ex-
pect the following: 
Hypothesis 2. The Conscientiousness facets of Dutiful-
ness, Deliberation, Achievement striving, and Competence 
will have a significant contribution in explaining the vari-
ance of faking. Dutifulness and Deliberation should be neg-
atively, while Achievement striving and Competence posi-
tively related to faking scores.
Hypothesis 3. The Neuroticism facets of Anxiety, De-
pression, Vulnerability, and Impulsiveness will have a sig-
nificant contribution in explaining the variance of faking. 
We expect all the facets to be negatively related to faking 




Participants were 202 students of the University of Za-
greb and alumni that had graduated in the period less than 
a year prior to participation, 57% of them female. Partici-
pants’ age ranged from 19 to 30 years, averaging 23.2 (SD 
= 2.10). Psychology students and alumni were not included.
Measures and procedures
The personality dimensions and facets were measured 
with Croatian version of Goldberg’s International Person-
ality Item Pool questionnaire (IPIP-300; Goldberg et al., 
2006; Jerneić, Galić, & Parmač, 2007, for registered Croa-
tian translation). Its 300 items measure the five personality 
dimensions (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreea-
bleness, and Conscientiousness) and thirty personality fac-
ets. Every personality dimension consists of six facets (see 
Table 2 for a list of facets and their classification), which 
are represented with 10 items each. Responses were made 
on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Participants responded to the IPIP-300 twice—first time 
they were asked to respond honestly (honest condition) and 
second time to respond imagining they are in a process of 
specific student scholarship selection program (applicant 
condition). As usual in faking research, we did not rotate the 
order of the two instructional sets. By instructing partici-
pants to respond “honestly”, we wanted to capture the true 
score of their personality dimensions. If the honest condition 
came after the applicant condition, the answers could be un-
der the influence of the previous set and not reflect the true 
scores (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Pauls & Crost, 
2005). The within-subjects design enabled us to calculate an 
individual difference score between two different instruc-
tional sets. Since the first instructional set was designed to 
elicit as little distortion as possible and the second to elicit 
distortion comparable to real applicants’ responding, the 
individual difference score represented a direct measure of 
faking in personnel selection. This rationale for composing 
a direct measure of faking was already used in several stud-
ies on determinants of faking behavior (McFarland & Ryan, 
2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). More detailed explana-
tion on how the direct measure of faking was calculated in 
this research will be provided in the Statistical methods and 
analyses section.
Finally, participants filled in a socio-demographic ques-
tionnaire and answered three post-manipulation questions. 
More specifically, they were asked to estimate the attractive-
ness of the student scholarship program (how attractive they 
found the student scholarship program), their motivation 
to fake (to what extent instructions motivated them to fake 
their responses in applicant condition) and their perceived 
ability to fake (how successful they were in faking their re-
sponses in applicant condition). These estimations were also 
made on a 7-point scale ranging from not attractive at all/
not motivated at all/not successful at all to extremely attrac-
tive/extremely motivated/completely successful.
Personality dimensions’ scale reliabilities were very 
high in both conditions, with α coefficients varying between 
.87 for Openness and .94 for Conscientiousness in honest 
condition, and between .84 and .94 for the same two traits in 
applicant condition. Reliability α coefficients of the facets 
in honest condition are shown in Table 2.
Statistical methods and analyses
In order to examine the contribution of personality fac-
ets in explaining the variance of faking, we conducted a 
series of five multiple regression analyses—separately for 
facets of each dimension of personality. A distinct analysis 
for each dimension was necessary because of the way the 
direct measure of faking was formed. As we already men-
tioned, a direct measure of faking was calculated as an indi-
vidual difference score between two different instructional 
sets. We calculated difference scores for all scales, hence 
each participant had five difference scores (i.e., a difference 
score for Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeable-
ness, and Conscientiousness, respectively). In order to get a 
measure of faking on the whole inventory, we summed up 
the absolute values of scale difference scores on all dimen-
sions. However, when regressing the faking score on facets 
belonging to a specific dimension, the difference score on 
this dimension was excluded from summation of the fak-
ing score. Facets could not be correlated with the difference 
score on dimension they belong to, because the facets scores 
themselves are imbedded within the difference score. Thus, 
five criterion measures were used: faking score exclud-
ing difference score on Neuroticism, and four more faking 
scores excluding Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, 
and Conscientiousness, respectively. Their α coefficients 
of reliability ranged from .59 (for faking score excluding 
difference score on Agreeableness) to .85 (for faking score 
32
TONKOVIĆ, Personality traits and faking noncognitive measures, Review of Psychology, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, 29-36
excluding difference score on Neuroticism). Even though 
some of these values are on the lower border of acceptance, 
they are comparable to reliability of difference scores used 
to measure faking in previous research on faking determi-
nants (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et 
al., 2006). As Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) pointed out, 
the most serious consequence of such lower reliability es-
timates in correlational analyses (such as those performed 
in studies on faking determinants) is difficulty in observing 
relationship between predictors and faking behavior—since 
correlations are attenuated due to unreliability. Hence, in 
this study we might expect the explained variance of faking 
measures to be underestimated.
RESULTS
Manipulation checks
To determine whether the manipulation in the appli-
cant condition was effective, paired-samples t-tests were 
conducted for the five personality dimensions to compare 
the applicant condition responses to the honest responses 
(Table 1). Test scores in applicant condition were signifi-
cantly higher for all scales, except for Neuroticism where 
they were significantly lower. The magnitude of the mean 
differences between the honest and the applicant scores, 
expressed with d-indices of effect size (Cohen, 1988), was 
equal or even greater than those found in similar studies 
conducted in real or simulated selection situations (Hough, 
1998; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 
1999). The present results indicate that the manipulation 
managed to motivate participants to behave like applicants, 
i.e., they distorted their results in socially desirable direc-
tion. Participants’ post-manipulation self-reports confirmed 
the conclusion that selection situation was simulated effec-
tively. Participants found the simulated student scholarship 
program in applicant condition attractive (M = 5.4, SD = 
1.50), claimed that the instructions did motivate them to 
fake their responses in applicant condition (M = 5.2, SD = 
1.61), and estimated they faked successfully (M = 5.1, SD 
= 1.20).
Test of hypotheses
The means and standard deviations of 30 personality fac-
ets, together with their univariate and multiple correlations 
with faking scores, are presented in Table 2. All Neuroticism 
facets showed positive correlations with faking—the more 
neurotic person was, the more he/she faked. However, the 
positive correlation was hypothesized only for the facet of 
Impulsiveness. Self-Consciousness, Impulsiveness, Depres-
sion, and Vulnerability all showed correlations above .30, 
which is considered as medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Closely to that value was the correlation of Anxiety (r(202) 
= .29, p < .01), while Angry hostility correlated with faking 
scores on the level of small effect size (r(202) = .24, p < .01). 
When put together in regression analysis, the Neuroticism 
facets explained 15% of the faking scores. This was parallel 
to the finding of McFarland and Ryan (2000) that Neuroti-
cism score explained up to 16% of the faking behavior vari-
ance. However, in the present study, the multiple correlation 
coefficient (R(202) = .41, p < .01) was not much larger than 
correlation of the same faking measure with Neuroticism 
scale score (r(202) = .38, p < .01), suggesting that analysis 
on lower-ordered facets was not of great benefit to explana-
tion of the criterion. In optimally weighted combination of 
the Neuroticism facets, the only two significant predictors 
were Self-consciousness and Impulsiveness with standard-
ized regression coefficients of .22 and .21, respectively. The 
remaining Neuroticism facets showed no significant contri-
bution. These findings are not exactly in line with our third 
hypothesis. Based on the model of Goffin and Boyd (2009), 
we assumed that, within the dimension of Neuroticism, the 
facets of Anxiety, Depression, and Vulnerability would also 
have a significant contribution in explaining the variance of 
faking, in addition to Impulsiveness. Moreover, Goffin and 
Boyd (2009) neglected the impact of the facet of Self-con-
sciousness, which turned to be the best predictor among the 
Neuroticism facets. We might conclude that faking is related 
to traits indicating applicant’s low self-confidence and low 
self-control, leading to higher motivation to fake. 
Unexpectedly, faking scores also correlated significantly 
with most of Extraversion facets. However, these correla-
tions were somewhat lower than those of Neuroticism fac-
ets and negative in sign – higher Extraversion scores were 
related to lower faking. The highest correlations were ob-
tained by the facets of Activity and Warmth, which correlat-
ed with faking scores on the level of medium effect (r(202) 
= -.33, p < .01, and r(202) = -.29, p < .01, respectively). 
Other Extraversion facets showed small effect size corre-
lations, with exception of Excitement seeking, which was 
not significantly correlated with faking scores. The fact that 
some of the facets were not significantly related to faking is 
Table 1 
Paired-samples t-tests comparing means across the honest and applicant 





M SD M SD
Neuroticism 218.1 42.46 131.0 31.67 25.124** 2.32
Extraversion 278.4 37.20 335.3 29.78 -19.129** -1.69
Openness 298.4 33.22 313.9 27.85 -6.357** -0.51
Agreeableness 298.2 33.38 315.9 33.41 -5.968** -0.53
Conscientiousness 283.3 43.34 382.7 30.83 -28.586** -2.64
** p < .01.
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in accordance with the finding that the multiple correlation 
coefficient (R(202) = -.38, p < .01) was larger than correla-
tion between same faking measure and the dimension scale 
score (r(202) = -.30, p < .01). Extraversion facets together 
explained 11% of the criterion, with Activity being the only 
significant predictor. Possible interpretation of this finding 
is that active people – having lots of activities, being more 
busy, and used to multitasking – are generally more suc-
cessful and do not have the need to fake their responses on 
personality questionnaires in order to enhance their chances 
to be selected.
Openness turned out to be the only dimension which 
consists of facets correlating with faking in different direc-
tions. Higher scores on Actions (r(202) = -.28, p < .01) and 
Ideas (r(202) = -.17, p < .01) were related to lower faking 
scores, contrary to Fantasy (r(202) = .24, p < .01) and Val-
ues (r(202) = .12, p < .05) which were related to higher fak-
ing scores. Even though Openness scale score univariately 
showed zero correlation, its facets together explained 17% 
of the criterion, which was more than any other dimension’s 
facets. Actions, Fantasy, and Values remained significant 
predictors. From these results we might conclude that more 
predisposed to faking would be the people who are more 
liberal in obeying rules, together with those who are im-
aginative and thus more capable to distort their personality 
responses in desirable direction. However, there is no plau-
sible interpretation for negative correlation between faking 
and Openness to actions—i.e., why do participants who are 
more keen on adventures fake less, while participants who 
don’t like changes fake more. 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for personality facets and results of a series of five regression analyses in which faking was regressed on facets of each personality 
dimension separately (N = 202)
Dimension Facet M SD α rfakinga β R R2adj
Neuroticism
Anxiety 38.8 10.44 .81 .29** -.02 .41 .15**
Angry hostility 37.2 10.64 .82 .24** .03
Depression 26.2 10.12 .89 .30** .11
Self-consciousness 37.7 7.05 .56 .32** .22*
Impulsiveness 40.1 8.03 .59 .31** .21**
Vulnerability 38.1 8.85 .76 .30** .01
Extraversion
Warmth 50.3 9.11 .84 -.29** -.17 -.37 .11**
Gregariousness 46.5 10.02 .80 -.19** .03
Assertiveness 46.9 7.81 .72 -.23** -.02
Activity 40.1 7.87 .66 -.33** -.25*
Excitement-seeking 41.3 10.76 .82 -.05 .00
Positive emotions 53.4 8.45 .80 -.19** -.04
Openness
Fantasy 51.9 10.32 .84 .24** .26** -.44 .17**
Aesthetics 56.4 9.53 .81 -.10 -.08
Feelings 50.4 8.33 .71 .05 .03
Actions 47.7 9.27 .80 -.28** -.29**
Ideas 51.0 9.20 .78 -.18** -.13
Values 41.1 9.29 .66 .12* .16*
Agreeableness
Trust 48.7 8.89 .84 -.21** -.12 -.30 .06**
Straightforwardness 54.0 7.64 .72 -.13* -.06
Altruism 56.7 7.27 .78 -.26** -.23*
Compliance 50.0 8.93 .75 -.16* -.02
Modesty 41.4 8.72 .77 .07 .08
Tender-mindedness 47.4 7.23 .62 -.13* .09
Conscientiousness
Competence 47.7 7.27 .73 -.36** -.30** -.42 .15**
Order 46.1 12.06 .87 -.12* .07
Dutifulness 53.8 8.16 .77 -.17** .01
Achievement striving 48.0 9.29 .80 -.23** .13
Self-discipline 41.5 11.04 .88 -.33** -.36**
Deliberation 46.2 9.24 .78 -.09 .12
Note. These statistics refer to personality facets assessed in honest condition. 
a When regressing the faking score on facets belonging to a specific dimension, the difference score on this dimension was excluded from summation of the 
faking score.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Again unexpectedly, faking scores were also significant-
ly related to most of Agreeableness facets: Altruism, Trust, 
Compliance, Straightforwardness, and Tender-mindedness. 
All the correlations were on the small effect size level and 
negative in sign. Multiple regression analysis showed that 
Agreeableness facets together explained only 6% of the fak-
ing scores, with Altruism being the only significant predic-
tor. The more altruistic participants were, the less they were 
prone to faking. This could be attributed to their effort to 
care about other people’s needs and feelings, which might 
not be the case if they won a scholarship instead of some-
body who “really deserved it”. 
Finally, Conscientiousness facets showed negative cor-
relations with faking scores, with exception of Deliberation 
which showed zero correlation. The correlation of Compe-
tence (r(202) = -.36, p < .01) was the highest of all univariate 
correlations between a personality facet and faking score. In 
Conscientiousness domain, it was followed by Self-disci-
pline (r(202) = -.33, p < .01), Achievement striving (r(202) 
= -.23, p < .01), Dutifulness (r(202) = -.17, p < .01), and 
Order (r(202) = -.12, p < .05). Most of these relationships 
turned out to be different than it was suggested by our sec-
ond hypothesis – according to Goffin and Boyd’s model 
(2009), Achievement striving and Competence should 
have been positively related to faking, while Deliberation 
negatively. Interestingly, our results confirmed a positive 
correlation (r(202) = .15, p < .05) of Competence with the 
perceived ability to fake (a post-manipulation self-rating of 
how successful participants were in faking their responses 
in applicant condition). Taken together, Conscientiousness 
facets explained 15% of the criterion, which was exactly 
the same as did Neuroticism facets. However, the increase 
in value of the correlation coefficient (from univariate cor-
relation between dimension scale score and faking to mul-
tivariate correlation between the same faking score and fac-
ets scores—from -.28 to -.42, respectively) was somewhat 
greater than for Neuroticism (from .38 to .41, respectively). 
From this we might conclude that inclusion of lower-or-
dered facets was of greater benefit to domain of Conscien-
tiousness. In support of this conclusion is the finding that 
McFarland and Ryan (2000) and Yu (2008), using solely 
the dimension scale score of Conscientiousness, managed 
to explain only up to 10% of the faking scores. According to 
regression coefficients obtained in the present study, among 
Conscientiousness facets Self-discipline (-.36) turned out to 
be a better predictor for faking than Competence (-.30). In 
this combination, the contribution of other facets was insig-
nificant. These findings offer a plausible explanation why 
conscientious applicants are less prone to faking. People 
who are self-disciplined and do their tasks more promptly, 
suggesting they are more successful in their work than ap-
plicants who apt to procrastinate, perceive themselves as 
generally successful and competent. Thus, they might not 
have the need to distort their answers, and consequently 
have lower motivation to fake.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine the contribution 
of personality in explaining the variance of applicants’ fak-
ing on a noncognitive measure. For this purpose, we op-
erationalized personality with an inventory measuring the 
dimensions and facets of the five-factor model of personal-
ity. We used a series of five multiple regression analyses to 
regress faking scores on the facet scores, within each of the 
five domains separately. The obtained results were not com-
pletely in line with our hypotheses, set on the basis of Goffin 
and Boyd’s model of faking (2009). Expectedly, the results 
showed significant contribution of Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism facets – each group of facets explained 15% 
of the criterion. However, the most efficient predictors of 
faking behavior seemed to be the facets of Openness, which 
explained 17% of the variance of applicant’s faking. The 
Extraversion and Agreeableness explained the least, but still 
a significant amount of the faking criterion (10% and 6%, 
respectively). On the facet level, our results showed that 
high faking scores could be best predicted with high scores 
on Impulsiveness, Self-consciousness, Fantasy, and Open-
ness to values, together with low scores on Activity, Open-
ness to actions, Altruism, Competence, and Self-discipline. 
In this research, faking was operationalized as an indi-
vidual difference score between two different instructional 
sets—the first was designed to elicit as little distortion as 
possible, and the second to elicit distortion comparable to the 
extent of real applicants’ faking. We formed five inventory 
faking scores—each of them excluded the difference scores 
of the dimension whose facets were then put in regression 
analysis to explain the faking score variance. Hence, we 
used different faking score for every group of facets. On one 
hand, this was necessary to avoid correlating faking score 
with the facets being included in it, which would lead to 
spuriously overrated correlation coefficients. On the other 
hand, in this way an estimation of the cumulative contribu-
tion of personality traits was impossible. The fact that these 
five faking scores showed very high intercorrelations (in the 
range from .87 to .95), encouraged us to roughly compare 
contributions of separate groups of facets. However, to es-
timate their joint contribution, it would be wrong to simply 
sum up the percentages of variance explained by separate 
domains, because empirical studies regularly show that the 
five factors of personality are not independent (e.g., van der 
Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010). The eight facets that 
we highlighted as significant predictors of faking behavior 
showed intercorrelations in the range from r(202) = -.02 (p 
> .05; between Altruism and Fantasy) to r(202) = .61 (p < 
.01; between Self-discipline and Activity). Thus, we might 
conclude that cumulative contribution of personality traits 
should be even more than 17%, especially when including 
a broader range of personality traits (e.g., self-monitoring, 
Machiavellianism, etc.) that are not part of the five-factor 
model. Since there are many other non-personality deter-
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minants (e.g., moral code, past experience, warning against 
faking…) proposed and/or confirmed in previous research 
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; 
Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Snell et al., 1999), even one 
sixth of the variance of faking behavior explained by per-
sonality can be considered as a relatively huge proportion.
When interpreting the results obtained in this study we 
should take into account its limitations. Namely, we used 
simulated personnel selection program on a primarily stu-
dent sample – it is possible that in actual personnel selection 
natural tendency to fake is determined by other factors. For 
instance, some situational variables (contextual anteced-
ents) could moderate the relationship between personality 
traits and faking. We tested this assumption using the post-
manipulation self-rating of attractiveness of student schol-
arship program simulated in this study. We expected that 
correlations between personality traits and faking behavior 
would be higher for participants who were more attracted by 
the outcome of the simulated selection, compared to partici-
pants who were not much attracted. Hence, we conducted 
a series of eight moderation regression analyses, for each 
of predictive facets separately. Specifically, faking score 
was regressed onto the facet, the self-report of attractive-
ness of the selection outcome, and the interaction/product of 
these two variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The moderator 
hypothesis was supported for the facet of Openness to val-
ues, whose interaction with attractiveness of the selection 
outcome was significant (Figure 1). For increasing level of 
attractiveness of the selection outcome, the correlation be-
tween Openness to values and faking score turns from nega-
tive to positive. Given the fact that real-life selection ap-
plicants usually apply for the jobs they are attracted to, this 
finding suggests that the contribution of the personality in 
this study might have been underestimated compared to real 
life situations. However, a laboratory study was needed to 
provide a direct measure of faking through a within-subjects 
design. In actual personnel selection it would be much more 
difficult to ensure that applicants’ answers in one condition 
were honest. 
The findings of the present study make several con-
tributions to the faking literature. To our best knowledge, 
this was the first study that has systematically tested which 
personality traits, and to what extent, determine the faking 
behavior on noncognitive measures in personnel selection. 
In addition, this study revealed the potential of facets of 
Openness to experiences in explaining the variance of fak-
ing. This was possible because the search for personality 
predictors was done not only on all of the five factors of the 
five-factor model, but on the facets level as well. In previ-
ous studies, researchers focused on examining the effect of 
broader dimensions, neglecting the eventual adverse effect 
of narrow facets within the same broad dimension (Goffin 
& Boyd, 2009). Finally, as far as we know, this was the first 
study that has empirically validated some of the assump-
tions proposed by the general model of faking (Goffin & 
Boyd, 2009). In future research, we suggest more thorough 
examination of the personality-faking relationship by test-
ing mediating effects of motivation and perceived ability to 
fake, as well as a replication on a non-student sample.
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